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Abstract
Matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example
of such a market is the sponsored search market. Here, as in other markets of that
kind, market equilibria correspond to feasible, envy free, and bidder optimal outcomes.
For settings without budgets such an outcome always exists and can be computed
in polynomial-time by the so-called Hungarian Method. Moreover, every mechanism
that computes such an outcome is incentive compatible. We show that the Hungar-
ian Method can be modified so that it finds a feasible, envy free, and bidder optimal
outcome for settings with budgets. We also show that in settings with budgets no
mechanism that computes such an outcome can be incentive compatible for all in-
puts. For inputs in general position, however, the presented mechanism—as any other
mechanism that computes such an outcome for settings with budgets—is incentive
compatible.
1 Introduction
In a matching market n bidders have to be matched to k items. A prime example of such a
market is the sponsored search market, where bidders correspond to advertisers and items
correspond to ad slots. In this market each bidder has a per-click valuation vi, each item
j has a click-through rate αj, and bidder i’s valuation for item j is vi,j = αj · vi. More
generally, each bidder i has a valuation vi,j for each item j. In addition, each item j has
a reserve price rj. A mechanism is used to compute an outcome (µ, p) consisting of a
matching µ and per-item prices pj. The bidders have quasi-linear utilities. That is, bidder
i’s utility is ui = 0 if he is unmatched and it is ui = vi,j − pj if he is matched to item j
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at price pj . The valuations are private information and the bidders need not report their
true valuations if it is not in their best interest to do so.
Ideally, the market should be in equilibrium. In the context of matching markets this
typically means that the outcome computed by the mechanism should be feasible, envy free,
and bidder optimal. An outcome is feasible if all bidders have non-negative utilities and if
the price of all matched items is at least the reserve price. It is envy free if it is feasible and
if at the current prices no bidder would get a higher utility if he was assigned a different
item. It is bidder optimal if it is envy free and if the utility of every bidder is at least as high
as in every other envy free outcome. Another requirement is that the mechanism should
be incentive compatible. A mechanism is incentive compatible if each bidder maximizes
his utility by reporting truthfully no matter what the other bidders report.
For matching markets of the above form a bidder optimal outcome always exists [10],
can be computed in polynomial time by the so-called Hungarian Method [8], and every
mechanism that computes such an outcome is incentive compatible [9]. The above model,
however, ignores the fact that in practice bidders often have budgets. Concrete examples
include Google’s and Yahoo’s ad auction. Budgets are also challenging theoretically as
they lead to discontinuous utility functions and thus break with the quasi-linearity of the
original model without budgets.
In our model each bidder can specify a maximum price for each item. If bidder i
specifies a maximum price of mi,j for item j, then he cannot pay any price pj ≥ mi,j.
Hence the utility of bidder i is ui = 0 if he is unmatched, it is ui = vi,j−pj if he is matched
to item j at price pj < mi,j (strict inequality), and it is ui = −∞ otherwise.
1 As before an
outcome is feasible if all bidders have non-negative utilities and if the price of all matched
items is at least the reserve price. It is envy free if it is feasible and if at the current prices
no bidder would get a higher utility if he was assigned a different item. It is bidder optimal
if it is envy free and if the utility of every bidder is at least as high as in every other envy
free outcome.
For this model we show that the Hungarian Method can be modified so that it always
finds a bidder optimal outcome in polynomial time. We also show that no mechanism that
computes such an outcome is incentive compatible for all inputs. For inputs in general
position, i.e., inputs with the property that in a certain weighted multi-graph defined on
the basis of the input no two walks have exactly the same weight, our mechanism—as any
other mechanism that computes a bidder optimal outcome—is incentive compatible [6].
All our results can be extended to more general (but still linear) utility functions.
A similar problem was previously considered by [1]. Their model differs from our model
in several ways: (1) The utility ui of bidder i is ui = 0 if he is unmatched, it is ui = vi,j−pj
1While requiring pj ≤ mi,j seems to be more intuitive, it has the disadvantage that the infimum envy
prices may not be envy free themselves: There are three bidders and one item. All bidders have a valuation
of 10 and the first two bidders have a maximum price of 5. Then any price p ≤ 5 is not envy free because
all bidders would prefer to be matched, and any price p > 5 is not bidder optimal because a slightly lower
price would still be envy free.
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if he is matched to item j at price pj ≤ mi,j (weak inequality), and it is ui = −∞ otherwise.
(2) The reserve prices ri,j may depend on the bidders and the items. (3) An outcome is envy
free if it is feasible and if for all bidders i and all items j either (a) ui ≥ vi,j −max(pj , ri,j)
or (b) pj ≥ mi,j. For these definitions they showed that for inputs in general position (a) a
bidder optimal outcome always exists, (b) a bidder optimal outcome can be computed by
a (rather complicated) mechanism in polynomial time, and (c) this mechanism is incentive
compatible. For inputs that are not in general position a bidder optimal outcome may not
exist as the following example shows.2,3
Example 1. There are two bidders and one item. The valuations and maximum prices
are as follows: v1,1 = 10, v2,1 = 10, and m1,1 = m2,1 = 5. While µ = {(1, 1)} with p1 = 5
is “best” for bidder 1, µ = {(2, 1)} with p1 = 5 is “best” for bidder 2. With our definitions
a bidder optimal outcome is µ = ∅ with p1 = 5.
unmatched
matched
5
0
10, 5
10, 5
5
0
5
10, 5
10, 5
5
Figure 1: Bidders are on the left side and items are on the right side of the graphs. The
numbers next to the bidder indicate his utility, the numbers next to the item indicate its
price. The labels along the edge show valuations and maximum prices. Matched edges are
bold, while unmatched edges are thin.
The sponsored search market was considered by [2], who proved the existence of a
unique feasible, envy free, and Pareto efficient outcome. They also presented an incentive
compatible mechanism to compute such an outcome in polynomial time. Their model,
however, is less general than the model studied here as (1) the valuations must be of the
form vi,j = αj · vi, and (2) the maximum prices are per-bidder, i.e., for each bidder i there
exists mi such that mi,j = mi for all j, and are required to be distinct.
Matching markets with more general, non-linear utility functions were studied in [4, 3,
6]. In [4] we proved the existence of a bidder optimal outcome for general utility functions
with multiple discontinuities. In [3] a polynomial-time mechanism for consistent utility
2An input is in general position if in the weighted, directed, and bipartite multigraph with one node
per bidder i, one node per item j, and one node for the dummy item j0 and forward edges from i to j
with weight −vi,j , backward edges from j to i with weight vi,j , reserve-price edges from i to j with weight
vi,j − ri,j , maximum-price edges from i to j with weight mi,j − vi,j , and terminal edges from i to j0 with
weight 0 no two walks that start with the same bidder, alternate between forward and backward edges, and
end with a distinct edge that is either a reserve-price edge, a maximum-price edge, or a terminal edge have
the same weight.
3The example is not in general position because the walk that consists of the maximum-price edge from
bidder 1 to item 1 and the walk that consists of the forward edge from bidder 1 to item 1, the backward
edge from item 1 to bidder 2, and the maximum-price edge from bidder 2 to item 1 have the same weight.
3
functions with a single discontinuity was given. In [6] we presented a polynomial-time
mechanism for piece-wise linear utility functions with multiple discontinuities.
To summarize: (1) We show how to modify the Hungarian Method in settings with
budgets so that it finds a bidder optimal outcome in polynomial time. (2) We show that
in settings with budgets no mechanism that computes a bidder optimal outcome can be
incentive compatible for all inputs. (3) We show how to extend these results to more
general (but still linear) utility functions.
2 Problem Statement
We are given a set I of n bidders and a set J of k items. We use letter i to denote a bidder
and letter j to denote an item. For each bidder i and item j we are given a valuation vi,j,
for each item j we are given a reserve price rj, and for each bidder i and item j we are
given a maximum price mi,j. We assume that the set of items contains a dummy item j0
for which all bidders have a valuation of zero, a reserve price of zero, and a maximum price
of ∞.4
We want to compute an outcome (µ, p) consisting of a matching µ ⊆ I×J and per-item
prices p = (p1, . . . , pk). We require that (a) every bidder i appears in exactly one bidder-
item pair (i, j) ∈ µ and that (b) every non-dummy item j 6= j0 appears in at most one
such pair. We allow the dummy item j0 to appear more than once. We call bidders/items
that are not matched to any non-dummy item/bidder unmatched. We regard the dummy
item as unmatched, regardless of whether it is matched or not.
The utility ui of bidder i is defined as ui = 0 if bidder i is unmatched and it is defined
as ui = ui,j(pj) if bidder i is matched to item j at price pj. We set ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj if
pj < mi,j and ui,j(pj) = −∞ if pj ≥ mi,j. We say that the outcome (µ, p) is feasible if (1)
ui ≥ 0 for all i, (2) pj0 = 0 and pj ≥ 0 for all j 6= j0, and (3) pj ≥ rj for all (i, j) ∈ µ. We
say that a feasible outcome (µ, p) is envy free if ui ≥ ui,j(pj) for all (i, j) ∈ I × J.
5 Finally,
we say that an envy free outcome (µ, p) is bidder optimal if ui ≥ u
′
i for all i and envy free
outcomes (µ′, p′).
We say that a mechanism is incentive compatible if for every bidder i, any two inputs
(v′i,j(·), rj ,m
′
i,j) and (v
′′
i,j(·), rj ,m
′′
i,j) with (a) v
′
i,j = vi,j and m
′
i,j = mi,j for i and all j
and (b) v′k,j = v
′′
k,j and m
′
k,j = m
′′
k,j for k 6= i and all j, and corresponding outcomes
(µ′, p′) and (µ′′, p′′) we have that ui,j′(p
′
j′) ≥ ui,j′′(p
′′
j′′) where (i, j
′) ∈ µ′ and (i, j′′) ∈ µ′′.
This formalizes that “lying does not pay off” as follows: Even if bidder i claims that his
valuation is v′′i,j instead of vi,j and that his maximum price is m
′′
i,j instead of mi,j he will
not achieve a higher utility with the prices and the matching computed by the mechanism.
4Reserve utilities, or outside options oi, can be modelled by setting vi,j0 = oi for all i.
5Since ui ≥ 0 and ui,j(pj) = −∞ if pj ≥ mi,j this is equivalent to requiring ui ≥ vi,j − pj for all items
j with pj < mi,j .
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3 Preliminaries
We define the first choice graph Gp = (I ∪ J, Fp) at prices p as follows: There is one
node per bidder i, one node per item j, and an edge from i to j if and only if item j
gives bidder i the highest utility, i.e., ui,j(pj) ≥ ui,j′(pj′) for all j
′. For i ∈ I we define
Fp(i) = {j : ∃ (i, j) ∈ Fp} and for j ∈ J we define Fp(j) = {i : ∃ (i, j) ∈ Fp}. Analogously,
for T ⊆ I we define Fp(T ) = ∪i∈TFp(i) and for S ⊆ J we define Fp(S) = ∪j∈SFp(j).
Fact 1. For all prices p such that pj0 = 0 and pj ≥ 0 for all j 6= j0 we have that (1) if
(i, j) ∈ Fp then pj < mi,j, and (2) if the outcome (µ, p) is envy free then µ ⊆ Fp.
We define the feasible first choice graph G˜p = (I ∪ J, F˜p) at prices p as follows: There
is one node per bidder i, one node per item j, and an edge from i to j if and only if item
j gives bidder i the highest utility, i.e., ui,j(pj) ≥ ui,j′(pj′) for all j
′, and the price of item
j is at least the reserve price, i.e., pj ≥ rj . For i ∈ I we define F˜p(i) = {j : ∃ (i, j) ∈ F˜p}
and for j ∈ J we define F˜p(j) = {i : ∃ (i, j) ∈ F˜p}. Analogously, for T ⊆ I we define
F˜p(T ) = ∪i∈T F˜p(i) and for S ⊆ J we define F˜p(S) = ∪j∈SF˜p(i).
Fact 2. For all prices p such that pj0 = 0 and pj ≥ 0 for all j 6= j0 we have that (1)
if (i, j) ∈ F˜p then rj ≤ pj < mi,j, and (2) the outcome (µ, p) is envy free if and only if
µ ⊆ F˜p.
We define an alternating path as a sequence of edges in F˜p that alternates between
matched and unmatched edges. We require that all but the last item on the path are
non-dummy items. The last item can (but does not have to) be the dummy item. A tree in
the feasible first choice graph G˜p is an alternating tree rooted at bidder i if all paths from
its root to a leaf are alternating paths that either end with the dummy item, an unmatched
item, or a bidder whose feasible first choice items are all contained in the tree. We say that
an alternating tree with root i is maximal if it cannot be extended.
Example 2. This is a (feasible) first choice graph and a maximal alternating tree for six
bidders and six items.
   
i1
i2
i3
i5
i6
j1
j2
j3
j4
j5
j0
i4
i1
j2j1
i2 i3
j3 j4
in Fp \ F˜p
j0 dummy item
in F˜p ∩ µ
in F˜p \ µ
j0
Figure 2: The bidders are i1–i6 and the items are j0–j5. Edges in F˜p ∩ µ are thick, edges
in F˜p are thin, and edges in Fp \ F˜p are dashed. The (feasible) first choice graph is on the
left and the maximal alternating tree is on the right.
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4 Mechanism
Our mechanism starts with an empty matching and prices all zero. To match an unmatched
bidder it computes a maximal alternating tree rooted at this bidder. If at least one of the
alternating paths in this tree ends at an unmatched item, then it augments the matching
by swapping the matched and unmatched edges along this path. Otherwise it raises the
prices of all items that are the first choice of at least one bidder in the tree by δ =
min(δout, δres, δmax), where (a) δout is the minimum amount required to add an edge from
a bidder in the tree to an item that was not among his first choice items to the first choice
graph, (b) δres is the minimum amount required to turn an infeasible first choice edge that
is incident to a bidder in the tree into a feasible first choice edge, and (c) δmax is the
minimum amount required to make a first choice edge that is incident to a bidder in the
tree drop out of the first choice graph.6
While updates corresponding to δmax can cause previously matched bidders to become
unmatched, neither updates corresponding to δout nor updates corresponding to δres will
ever unmatch previously matched bidders: They preserve all feasible first choice edges that
are incident to bidders in the tree, and thus the feasible first choice edges along which these
bidders are matched. They may cause first choice edges from bidders not in the tree to
first choice items of bidders in the tree to drop put of the first choice graph, but none of
these bidders will be matched along such an edge (because otherwise the corresponding
bidder would belong to the tree).7
Modified Hungarian Method.
input: valuations vi,j , reserve prices rj , maximum prices mi,j
output: bidder optimal outcome (µ, p)
1 pj := 0 for all j ∈ J , ui := maxj vi,j for all i ∈ I, and µ := ∅
2 while there exists an unmatched bidder i0 do
3 find maximal alternating tree rooted at bidder i0 in G˜p
4 let T and S be the set of bidders and items in this tree
5 set ui := maxj ui,j(pj) for all i ∈ T
6 while all items j ∈ S are matched and j0 6∈ S do
7 compute δ := min(δout, δres, δmax) where
8 δout := mini∈T,j∈J\Fp(i)(ui + pj − vi,j)
9 δres := minj∈Fp(T )\F˜p(T )(rj − pj)
10 δmax := mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)(mi,j − pj)
11 update prices, utilities, and matching as follows
12 pj := pj + δ for all j ∈ Fp(T ) \\ leads to new graph
13 ui := maxj ui,j(pj) for all i ∈ T
6For δmax to be well defined we need that the utility that bidder i has for item j is defined with pj < mi,j
(weak inequality), and not with pj ≤ mi,j (weak inequality).
7This is not true if the reserve prices are allowed to depend on the bidders and the items and the prices
are updated as in [5]. See A for a counter example.
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14 µ := µ ∩ F˜p \\ removes unfeasible edges
15 find maximal alternating tree rooted at bidder i0 in G˜p
16 let T and S be the set of bidders and items in this tree
17 set ui := maxj ui,j(pj) for all i ∈ T
18 end while
19 augment µ along alternating path rooted at i0 in G˜p
20 end while
21 output µ and p
5 Feasibility and Envy Freeness
Theorem 1. The Modified Hungarian Method finds a feasible and envy free outcome. It
can be implemented to run in time O(n · k3).
Proof. Since the outcome (µ, p) maintained by the Modified Hungarian Method satisfies
pj0 = 0 and pj ≥ 0 for all j 6= j0 and µ ⊆ F˜p at all times it suffices to show that after
O(n · k3) steps all bidders are matched. The prices, the utilities, and the matching can be
initialized in time O(n · k) (l. 1). To analyze the remaining running time we divide it into
the total time spent in (1) the outer while loop without the inner while loop (ll. 2–5 and
19–20) and (2) the inner while loop (ll. 6–18).
To (1): We have that (a) after each execution of the outer while loop a previously
unmatched bidder gets matched and (b) a matched bidder i can only become unmatched
if the price of the item j he is matched to reaches mi,j. Since there are O(n) many bidders
and (b) can happen at most O(n · k) times (a) and (b) show that after O(n · k) executions
of the outer while loop all bidders are matched. The maximal alternating tree, the utilities
of the bidders in the tree, and the augmenting path can be computed via breadth-first
search: Start with T = S = ∅. Add bidder i0 to T . Compute the utility of the bidders
added to T , determine their feasible first choice items, and add these items to S. This
takes time O(k) per bidder. For each non-dummy item added to S add to T the bidder
that this item is matched to. This takes time O(k) per item. Continue like this until no
more bidders resp. items are added to T resp. S. Overall this procedure takes at most
O(k2) steps because at most O(k) bidders resp. items are added to T resp. S. We conclude
that the total running time of the outer while loop is O(n · k3).
To (2): We say that an iteration of the inner while loop is special if (a) right before
the iteration of the inner while loop the outer while loop was executed, (b) in the previous
iteration of the inner while loop a reserve price was reached, or (c) in the previous iteration
of the inner while loop a maximum price was reached. Since (a)–(c) can happen at most
O(n · k) times the number of special iterations is O(n · k). We show next how a sequence
consisting of a special iteration and all non-special iterations that follow it can be imple-
mented in time O(k2). Since there are at most O(n · k) special iterations this shows that
the total running time of the inner while loop is O(n · k3).
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The implementation keeps track of ui for all i ∈ T , pj for all j ∈ Fp(T ), the matching
µ, and the sets T and S. In addition, it keeps track of the following slack variables, which
have to be initialized at the beginning of the first iteration:
γoutj = mini∈T (ui + pj − vi,j) for j ∈ J \ Fp(T )
γresj = rj − pj for j ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T )
γmaxj = mini∈T (mi,j − pj) for j ∈ Fp(T )
Since there are at most O(k) items in J and at most O(k) bidders in T initializing the slack
variables takes time O(k2). Since δout, δres, and δmax are the minima over the corresponding
slack variables the slack variables can be used to compute δ in time O(k).
We begin by showing how to update the data in all iterations in the sequence with
δ = δout. We update the utilities ui of all bidders i ∈ T by subtracting δ in time O(k).
We update the prices of all items j ∈ Fp(T ) by adding δ in time O(k). We do not have
to update the matching. We update the maximal alternating tree and the utilities of the
bidders that are added to the tree as follows: We first add all items that are added to
F˜p(T ) to S. Since these are precisely the items for which δ = γ
out
j and pj ≥ rj we can
find these items in time O(k). For each non-dummy item added to S we add to T the
bidder that this item is matched to. This takes time O(k) per item. Afterwards we update
the utilities of the bidders added to T and add their feasible first choice items to S (in
time O(k) per bidder) and for each non-dummy item added to S we add to T the bidder
that this item is matched to (in time O(k) per item). We continue like this until no more
bidders resp. items are added to T resp. S. Let T and S resp. T ′ and S′ denote the sets of
bidders and items before resp. after the update. Then overall this procedure takes at most
O(k + |T ′ \ T | · k + |S′ \ S| · k) steps.
We update the slack variables as follows. Let p and p′ denote the prices before and after
the update. For j ∈ J \Fp(T ) and j ∈ J \Fp′(T
′) we set γoutj = min(γ
out
j −δ,mini∈T ′\T (ui+
p′j − vi,j)). This takes time O(|T
′ \ T |) per item. For j ∈ J \ Fp(T ) and j ∈ Fp′(T
′) we
remove γoutj . If j ∈ Fp′(T
′) \ F˜p′(T
′) we add γresj = rj − p
′
j and γ
max
j = mini∈T ′(mi,j − p
′
j).
Otherwise, if j ∈ F˜p′(T
′) we only add γmaxj = mini∈T ′(mi,j − p
′
j). Removing γ
out
j takes
time O(1) per item, adding γresj takes time O(1) per item, and adding γ
max
j takes time
O(k) per item. For j ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T ) and j ∈ Fp′(T
′) \ F˜p′(T
′) we update γresj = γ
res
j − δ
and γmaxj = min(γ
max
j − δ,mini∈T ′\T (mi,j − p
′
j)). For j ∈ F˜p(T ) and j ∈ F˜p′(T
′) we update
γmaxj = min(γ
max
j − δ,mini∈T ′\T (mi,j − p
′
j)). In both cases, updating γ
res
j takes time O(1)
per item and updating γmaxj takes time O(|T
′ \ T |) per item.
Since in a sequence of iterations with δ = δout (a) every iteration adds at least one item
to Fp(T ), (b) every item can move from J \ Fp(T ) to Fp(T ) at most once, and (c) at most
O(k) bidders resp. items are added to T resp. S we conclude that updating the data in all
iterations in the sequence with δ = δout takes time O(k
2).
We conclude by showing how to update the data in iterations corresponding to δ = δres
or δ = δmax in time O(k
2). The utilities ui of all bidders i ∈ T can be updated in time
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O(k) per bidder by setting ui = maxj ui,j(pj). The prices pj of all items j ∈ Fp(T ) can
be updated in time O(1) per item by adding δ. The matching µ can be updated in time
O(k) by removing edges (i, j) for which the new price of item j exceeds mi,j. The maximal
alternating tree and the utilities of the bidders in the tree can be computed from scratch
in time O(k2) via breadth-first search (as in the outer while loop).
6 Bidder Optimality
Theorem 2. The Modified Hungarian Method finds a bidder optimal outcome.
We proceed as follows: In Lemma 1 we show that an envy free outcome (µ, p) is
bidder optimal if we have that pj ≤ p
′
j for all items j and all envy free outcomes (µ
′, p′).
Afterwards, we define strict overdemand and prove a lower bound on the price increase of
strictly overdemanded items in Lemma 2. Finally, in Lemma 3, we argue that whenever
the Modified Hungarian Method updates the prices it updates the prices according to
Lemma 2. This completes the proof.
Lemma 1. If the outcome (µ, p) is envy free and pj ≤ p
′
j for all j and all envy free
outcomes (µ′, p′), then the outcome (µ, p) is bidder optimal.
Proof. For a contradiction suppose that there exists an envy free outcome (µ′, p′) such that
u′i > ui for some bidder i. Let j be the item that bidder i is matched to in µ and let j
′ be
the item that bidder i is matched to in µ′. Since pj′ ≤ p
′
j′ and p
′
j′ < mi,j′ we have that
ui,j′(pj′) = vi,j′ − pj′ . Since the outcome (µ, p) is envy free we have that ui = ui,j(pj) =
vi,j − pj ≥ ui,j′(pj′) = vi,j′ − pj′ . It follows that u
′
i = vi,j′ − p
′
j′ > ui = vi,j − pj ≥ vi,j′ − pj′
and, thus, p′j′ < pj′ . This gives a contradiction.
We say that a (possibly empty) set S ⊆ J \ {j0} is strictly overdemanded for prices p
with respect to T ⊆ I if (i) F˜p(T ) ⊆ S and (ii) ∀ R ⊆ S and R 6= ∅ : |F˜p(R) ∩ T | > |R|.
Using Hall’s Theorem [7] one can show that an envy free outcome exists for given prices p
such that pj0 = 0 and pj ≥ 0 for all j 6= j0 if and only if there is no strictly overdemanded
set of items S in the feasible first choice graph G˜p.
Lemma 2. Given p such that pj0 = 0 and pj ≥ 0 for all j 6= j0 let ui = maxj ui,j(pj) for
all i. Suppose that S ⊆ J \ {j0} is strictly overdemanded for prices p with respect to T ⊆ I
and let δ = min(δout, δres, δmax), where
δout = mini∈T,j∈J\Fp(i)(ui + pj − vi,j), and
δres = mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)\F˜p(i)(rj − pj), and
δmax = mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)(mi,j − pj).
Then, for every envy free outcome (µ′, p′) with p′j ≥ pj for all j, we have that p
′
j ≥ pj + δ
for all j ∈ Fp(T ).
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Proof. We prove the claim in two steps. In the first step, we show that p′j ≥ pj + δ for all
j ∈ F˜p(T ). In the second step, we show that p
′
j ≥ pj + δ for all j ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T ).
Step 1. Consider the set of items A = {j ∈ F˜p(T ) | ∀k ∈ F˜p(T ) : p
′
j −pj ≤ p
′
k−pk} ⊆ S
and the set of bidders B = F˜p(A)∩T ⊆ T. If A = ∅ then there is nothing to show. If A 6= ∅
then assume by contradiction that δ′ = minj∈F˜p(T )(p
′
j − pj) < δ. We show below that in
this case |B| > |A| and A ⊇ F˜p′(B). On the one hand this shows that |A| ≥ |F˜p′(B)| and,
thus, |B| > |F˜p′(B)|. On the other hand this shows that F˜p′(B) ⊆ A ⊆ S ⊆ J \ {j0}, i.e.,
F˜p′(B) does not contain the dummy item. But if F˜p′(B) does not contain the dummy item
then the outcome (µ′, p′) can only be envy free if every bidder in B is matched to a distinct
item in F˜p′(B) and, thus, |B| ≤ |F˜p′(B)|. This gives a contradiction.
The set of items S is strictly overdemanded for prices p with respect to T . Thus, since
A ⊆ S and A 6= ∅, we have |B| = |F˜p(A) ∩ T | > |A|. Next we show that A ⊇ F˜p′(B). It
suffices to show that F˜p′(i) \ A = ∅ for all bidders i ∈ B. For a contradiction suppose that
there exist a bidder i ∈ B and an item k ∈ F˜p′(i) \ A. It follows that (1) ui,k(p
′
k) ≥ 0,
(2) ui,k(p
′
k) ≥ ui,k′(p
′
k′) for all k
′, and (3) p′k ≥ rk. In particular, rk ≤ p
′
k < mi,k and so
ui,k(p
′
k) = vi,k − p
′
k. We also know that there exists j ∈ A such that j ∈ F˜p(i). Since
j ∈ A we have that p′j < pj + δ ≤ pj + δmax ≤ mi,j and so ui,j(p
′
j) = vi,j − p
′
j. Thus, since
k ∈ F˜p′(i), vi,k − p
′
k ≥ vi,j − p
′
j. Finally, since j ∈ F˜p(i) and pk ≤ p
′
k < mi,k, we also have
that ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj ≥ ui,k(pk) = vi,k − pk. We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: k ∈ J \ Fp(B). Since δ ≤ δout ≤ ui + pk − vi,k and ui = vi,j − pj we have that
δ ≤ vi,j − pj + pk − vi,k. Rearranging this shows that vi,k− pk + δ ≤ vi,j − pj. Since p
′
k ≥ pk
and pj > p
′
j − δ this implies that vi,k − p
′
k < vi,j − p
′
j. Contradiction!
Case 2: k ∈ Fp(B) \ F˜p(B). We have δ ≤ δres ≤ rk − pk. If p
′
k − pk ≤ p
′
j − pj , then,
since p′j − pj = δ
′ < δ, we have that p′k < pk + δ ≤ rk. Contradiction! If p
′
k − pk > p
′
j − pj ,
then, since vi,j − pj ≥ vi,k − pk, we get that vi,j − p
′
j > vi,k − p
′
k. Contradiction!
Case 3: k ∈ F˜p(B) \ A. Since j ∈ A and k 6∈ A we have that p
′
k − pk > δ
′ = p′j − pj .
Since vi,j − pj ≥ vi,k − pk this implies that vi,j − p
′
j > vi,k − p
′
k. Contradiction!
Step 2. Consider an arbitrary item j ∈ Fp(T )\ F˜p(T ) such that p
′
j−pj ≤ p
′
j′−pj′ for all
j′ ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T ) and a bidder i ∈ T such that j ∈ Fp(i). Assume by contradiction that
δ′ = p′j − pj < δ. We show that this implies that F˜p′(i) = ∅, which gives a contradiction to
the fact that the outcome (µ′, p′) is envy free.
First observe that δ′ < δ ≤ δres ≤ rj − pj and, thus, p
′
j < pj + δ ≤ rj, which shows
that j 6∈ F˜p′(i). Next consider an arbitrary item k 6= j. For a contradiction suppose that
k ∈ F˜p′(i). It follows that rk ≤ p
′
k < mi,k and ui,k(p
′
k) = vi,k − p
′
k ≥ ui,j(p
′
j). Since
p′j = pj + δ
′ < pj + δ ≤ pj + δmax ≤ mi,j we have that ui,j(p
′
j) = vi,j − p
′
j and, thus,
vi,k − p
′
k ≥ vi,j − p
′
j . Finally, since j ∈ Fp(i) and pk ≤ p
′
k < mi,k, we have that ui,j(pj) =
vi,j − pj ≥ ui,k(pk) = vi,k − pk.
As in Step 1 we distinguish three cases: If k ∈ J \ Fp(T ) or k ∈ Fp(T ) \ F˜p(T ), then by
the same argument as in Cases 1 and 2 above we get a contradiction. If k ∈ F˜p(T ), then
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from the result of Step 1 we know that p′k−pk ≥ δ > δ
′ = p′j−pj . Since vi,j−pj ≥ vi,k−pk
this implies that vi,j − p
′
j > vi,k − p
′
k, which also gives a contradiction.
Lemma 3. Let p be the prices computed by the Modified Hungarian Method. Then for
every envy free outcome (µ′, p′) we have that pj ≤ p
′
j for all j.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction over the price updates. Let pt denote the prices
after the t-th price update.
For t = 0 the claim follows from the fact that ptj = 0 for all j and p
′
j ≥ 0 for all j and
feasible outcomes (µ′, p′).
For t > 0 assume that the claim is true for t−1. Let S ⊆ J \{j0} be the set of items and
let T be the set of bidders considered by the Modified Hungarian Method for the t-th price
update. We claim that S ⊆ J \ {j0} is strictly overdemanded for prices p
t−1 with respect
to T. This is true because: (1) S and T are defined as the set of items resp. bidders in a
maximal alternating tree and, thus, there are no edges in F˜pt−1 from bidders in T to items
in J \S which shows that F˜pt−1(T ) ⊆ S. (2) Because for every subset R ⊆ S with R 6= ∅ all
items in R are matched the number of “neighbors” that these items have in the maximal
alternating tree is strictly larger than |R|, i.e., |F˜pt−1(R) ∩ T | > |R|. Since p
t−1 ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ J and pt−1j0 = 0 and, by the induction hypothesis, p
′
j ≥ p
t−1
j for all j ∈ J Lemma 2
shows that p′j ≥ p
t−1
j + δ for all items j ∈ Fpt−1(T ). The Modified Hungarian Method sets
ptj = p
t−1
j + δ for all items j ∈ Fpt−1(T ) and p
t
j = p
t−1
j for all items j 6∈ Fpt−1(T ). We
conclude that p′j ≥ p
t
j for all items j ∈ J .
7 Incentive Compatibility
The following example shows that no mechanism that computes a bidder optimal outcome
is incentive compatible for all inputs. In subsequent work we show that every mechanism
that computes a bidder optimal outcome is incentive compatible for inputs in general
position [6]. Thus, our mechanism—just as the mechanism of [1]—is incentive compatible
for inputs in general position. Note that the example shows that a bidder can improve his
utility by lying only about the valuation of a single item. Also note that (i) there are no
reserve prices, i.e., rj = 0 for all j, (ii) the maximum prices depend only on the item, i.e.,
for all i there exists a constant mi such that mi,j = mi for all j, and (iii) no two bidders
have the same maximum price, i.e., mi 6= mk for any two bidders i 6= k.
Example 3. There are three bidders and three items. The valuations are v1,1 = 6, v1,2 = 5,
v2,1 = 11, v2,2 = 5, v2,3 = 4, v3,2 = 10, and v3,3 = 4. The maximum prices are m1 = 6,
m2 = 4, and m3 = 3. Reserve prices are zero.
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Figure 3: Bidders are on the left side and items are on the right side of the graphs. The
numbers next to the bidders indicate their utilities. The numbers next to the items indicate
their prices. The labels along the edges show valuations and maximum prices. The graph
on the left depicts the bidder optimal outcome for the “true” valuations. The graph on the
right depicts the bidder optimal outcome for the “falsified” valuations. Specifically, in the
graph on the right bidder 2 misreports his valuation for item 1. This gives him a strictly
higher utility, and shows that lying “pays off”.
8 Generalized Linear Utility Functions
The following theorem generalizes our results to utilities of the form ui,j(pj) = vi,j−ci ·cj ·pj
for pj < mi,j and ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise. This reduction does not work if ui,j(pj) =
vi,j − ci,j · pj for pj < mi,j and ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise. We give a polynomial-time
mechanism for utility functions of this form in [6].
Theorem 3. The outcome (µˆ, pˆ) is bidder optimal for vˆ = (vˆi,j), rˆ = (rˆj), mˆ = (mˆi,j) and
utility functions ui,j(pj) = vi,j − ci · cj · pj if pj < mi,j and ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise if and
only if the outcome (µ, p), where µ = µˆ and p = (cj · pˆj), is bidder optimal for v = (vˆi,j/ci),
r = (cj · rˆj), m = (cj · mˆi,j) and utility functions ui,j(pj) = vi,j − pj if pj < mi,j and
ui,j(pj) = −∞ otherwise.
Proof. Since pˆj < mˆi,j if and only if p < mi,j we have that uˆi,j(pˆj) = ci · ui,j(pj). Since
µˆ = µ this implies that uˆi = ci · ui for all i.
Feasibility. Since ci > 0 for all i and cj > 0 for all j we have that uˆi ≥ 0 for all i,
pˆj0 = 0 and pˆj ≥ 0 for all j if and only if ui = uˆi/ci ≥ 0 for all i, pj0 = cj · pˆj0 = 0 and
pj = cj · pˆj ≥ 0 for all j. Since µ = µˆ, rj = cj · rˆj , and pj = cj · pˆj for all i and j we have
that rˆj ≤ pˆj for all (i, j) ∈ µˆ if and only if rj ≤ pj for all (i, j) ∈ µ.
Envy freeness. If (µˆ, pˆ) is envy free then (µ, p) is envy free because ui = ci · uˆi ≥
ci · uˆi,j(pˆj) = ui,j(pj) for all i and j. If (µ, p) is envy free then (µˆ, pˆ) is envy free because
uˆi = ui/ci ≥ ui,j(pj)/ci = uˆi,j(pˆj) for all i and j.
Bidder optimality. Suppose that (µˆ, pˆ) is bidder optimal but (µ, p) is not. Then there
must be an envy free outcome (µ′, p′) such that u′i > ui for at least one i. By transforming
(µ′, p′) into (µˆ′, pˆ′) we get an envy free outcome for which uˆ′i = ci · u
′
i > ci · ui = uˆi.
Contradiction!
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Suppose that (µ, p) is bidder optimal but (µˆ, pˆ) is not. Then there must be an envy free
outcome (µˆ′, p′) such that uˆ′i > uˆi for at least one i. By transforming (µˆ
′, pˆ′) into (µ′, p′)
we get an envy free outcome for which u′i = uˆ
′
i/ci > uˆi/ci = ui. Contradiction!
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A Counter Example
Example 4. There are three bidders and three items. The valuations are v1,1 = 4 and
v1,2 = v2,2 = v2,3 = v3,2 = v3,3 = 6. The reserve prices are r1,1 = r1,2 = r2,3 = r3,3 = 0
and r2,2 = r3,2 = 4. All other valuations and reserve prices are zero. Maximum prices are
infinity.
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0
0
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4
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in Fp \ F˜p
in F˜p ∩ µ
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Figure 4: Bidders are on the left side and items are on the right side of the graphs. The
numbers next to the bidders indicate the utilities that they would get if they were matched
to one of their first choice items. The numbers next to the items indicate their prices. The
labels along the edges show valuations and reserve prices. Edges in F˜p ∩ µ are thick, edges
in F˜ \ µ are thin, edges in Fp \ F˜p are dashed, and all other edges are dotted. If the prices
of the items in Fp(T ) are updated as in [5], i.e., δres = mini∈T,j∈Fp(i)\F˜p(i)(ri,j − pj), then
bidder 1 gets unmatched. This shows that with bidder-item dependent reserve prices ri,j
bidders can also get unmatched if no maximum price is reached.
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